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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE1955 TENNESSEE SURVEY
AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR.*

The reported Tennessee cases in the criminal field decided during
the past year deal, as usual, mostly with procedural problems, and
only to a lesser extent with problems of substantive criminal law.
SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW

Homicide: In Ivy v. State' the defendant, in the course of a fight
with A, stabbed B, a peacemaker, killing him. The defendant appealed
his conviction of involuntary manslaughter on the theory that the
evidence did not support the verdict, since it showed that the defendant was striking at A in self-defense when he unfortunately
stabbed B. The court held that the jury could properly find on the
evidence either that (1) the defendant, not A, was the aggressor, or
(2) even if A were the aggressor, defendant was not in imminent
danger or reasonably supposed danger of death or serious bodily
injury, and in either event the defense of self-defense was inapplicable.
The case thus simply reiterates some well-settled principles of selfdefense in homicide cases.
Crawford i. State2 involved a conviction of voluntary manslaughter
on a murder charge where the jury believed the evidence that the defendant intentionally killed the victim in a rage after the latter struck
the defendant with a beer can. Therein illustrated is the settled law
of homicide that an intentional killing may be reduced from murder
to voluntary manslaughter if the defendant was actually and reasonably provoked by the victim's conduct into an irresistible passion to
kill, and the defendant neither actually cooled off nor had a reasonable
time to cool off between the provocation and the fatal blow.
Rape: In Walker v. State3 the court adopted the prevailing modern
rule that for the crime of violating the age-of-consent (known frequently elsewhere as statutory rape) statute4 the sexual intercourse
element of the crime requires only the "slightest penetration" of the
sexual organ of the female by that of the male. It is not necessary
that the vagina be entered or the hymen be ruptured; the entering
of the vulva or labia is sufficient. This "slightest penetration" rule
would of course be equally applicable to ordinary forcible rape, and
very likely to sodomy as well.
*Professor of Law, University of Colorado; Visiting Associate Professor
of Law, Vanderbilt University, 1954-55.
1. 277 S.W.2d 363 (Tenn. 1955).
2. 273 S.W.2d 689 (Tenn. 1954).
3. 273 S.W.2d 707 (Tenn. 1954).
4. TENN. CODE ANN.

§ 10786 (Williams 1934).
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Sodomy: The "crime against nature" is not defined in the Tennessee
statute punishing the offense except to the extent stated that it may
be accomplished "either with mankind or any beast." Can the crime
be committed with mankind by penetration "per os" (mouth-genital
contact) as well as "per anum"? In Fisher v. State5 the male defendant apparently inserted his organ into the mouth of his partner,
whose sex is not revealed in the report. The court held that this conduct amounts to the crime against nature, following the modern trend
elsewhere and refusing to follow the common-law definition of
sodomy, which, being limited to penetration "per anum" where human
partners were involved, did not include mouth-genital connections.
It is interesting to note that, at the same time that Tennessee is expanding the scope of sodomy, the American Law Institute's Model
Penal Code presently in preparation is now wrestling with the social
problem of whether abnormal sexual practices in private between
consenting adults should constitute criminal conduct at all, in view
of the recent rash of sociological studies pointing to the fact that such
conduct is common although rarely punished, and that it causes
little harm to others where not involving force, corruption of minors
or public display, and that it serves as an important source of material
for black-mailers.
Larceny: One rather routine statement appears in a civil case to
the effect that one who buys property giving therefor a check on a
bank where his funds are insufficient is not guilty of larceny by
trick.6 The statutory crime of false pretenses and the more modern
bad check statutes were, of course, created to plug this very loophole
in the crime of larceny, where title is obtained by fraud.
Extortion: State v. Smith7 involved a prosecution for conspiracy
to commit extortion, the charge apparently growing out of a strike
situation. Although the reported case does not spell out the exact nature of the threat which the striking defendants conspired to make
to the nonstriking workers, apparently it was something like: if
you do not quit work, we shall beat you up. Is this kind of threat
sufficient to constitute extortion, defined by Tennessee statute8 as
including (among other threats) a threat to do injury to the person
of another "with intent thereby to extort any money, property or
pecuniary advantage whatever, or to compel the person so threatened
to do any act against his will"? The court held that the indictment
which charged that the defendants conspired to threaten the victims
5. 277 S.W.2d 340 (Tenn. 1955).
6. Hunter v. Moore, 276 S.W.2d 754 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1954) (The court
holds that the man who gave the check got title to the car, and thereafter
could pass good title to a bona fide purchaser; compare the situation of one
who purchases in good faith from a thief.).
7. 273 SW.2d 143 (Tenn. 1954).
8. TENN. CODE ANN. § 10806 (Williams 1934).
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"with intent to extort from them their pecuniary advantage of their
right to work" properly charged conspiracy to commit extortion. The
right to work is "property" and a "pecuniary advantage" which can
be extorted from a worker by threats of violence. Perhaps a simpler,
less cumbersome theory of extortion might be that the defendants by
threats intended to compel the nonstrikers to do an act (leave their
jobs) against their will, although it might be argued that the
intent was to induce unwilling nonaction rather than action, and the
former is not covered by the extortion statute.
Conspiracy: The case just discussed 9 also held that the crime of
conspiracy in Tennessee is complete upon the agreement of the conspirators to do the wrongful act (e.g. to commit a crime, such as extortion), no overt act in carrying out the conspiracy being required
under the Tennessee conspiracy statute. 10 This was true of the
common-law crime of conspiracy and is true today under most statutes,
although a few jurisdictions have statutes requiring some overt act.
The court, in its zeal in following Corpus Juris Secundum, apparently overlooked a related section of the code,loa providing that
for conspiracy some act to carry out the object of the agreement is
necessary except where the agreement is "to commit a felony on the
person of another, or to commit the crimes of arson or burglary." The
various counts in the Smith case-charging conspiracy to commit assault and battery (probably assault and battery is a Tennessee misdemeanor), to commit an act injurious to public health, morals, trade
or commerce, to commit malicious mischief (a Tennessee misdemeanor), and possibly even to commit extortion-do not seem to
qualify as charging conspiracies "to commit a felony on the person
of another," so that some overt act is necessary.
The same case further states that the crime of conspiracy to commit a crime, and the crime itself if later committed, are separate
crimes. This probably means that when conspirators are tried for
conspiracy to commit a crime, they cannot secure an acquittal by
showing they went ahead and, pursuant to their agreement, committed the crime." Doubtless also they can be convicted of and
sentenced for both the conspiracy and the completed crime.' 2 An
analogous problem arises in cases of attempt, where the better
view is that it is no defense to a conviction for attempted crime that
the attempt was successful; yet one successful attempt cannot support
two separate convictions, one for attempt and the other for the completed crime.
9. State v. Smith, 273 S.W.2d 143 (Tenn. 1954).
10. TEN. CODE ANN. § 11064 (Williams 1934).
10a. Id. § 11068, which modifies § 11066.
11. See Notes, Merger of Conspiracy in Completed Offense, 37 A.L.R. 778
(1925), 75 A.L.R. 1411 (1931), showing that such is the general rule.
12. See Notes, 92 L. Ed. 185 (1948), 98 L. Ed. 448 (1954).
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Drunken driving: There is sometimes a problem as to whether the
defendant, prosecuted for driving while drunk, was "driving" within
the meaning of the statute. 13 Is one driving when he turns on the
ignition and steps on the starter, but the motor is not yet running?
Is he driving when he is being towed or pushed along the street or
highway? In Hester v. State14 the court held that one is guilty of
drunken driving who while intoxicated sits at the wheel of a car with
engine dead which is being pushed by another car along the highway.
In view of the purpose to be effectuated by the statute-protection
against situations involving danger to the persons and property of
15
others on the streets and highways-this result seems entirely sound.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Evidence: Many of the criminal cases of the past year involved
questions of evidence, all of which have been treated elsewhere in this
16
1955 Survey.
Arrest: In Satterfeld v. State1 the defendant, on his trial for
driving while drunk, claimed that the police officers made an illegal
arrest without a warrant and therefore could not testify as to his
intoxicated condition at the time of the arrest. The court held that
this testimony was not inadmissible as the result of an unconstitutional
search, because there was no search; there is no comparable rule that
evidence is inadmissible if the result of an unlawful arrest. "[T]here
13. Tenn. Public Acts 1953, c. 202.
14. 270 S.W.2d 321 (Tenn. 1954).
15. Cf. Line v. State, 191 Tenn. 380, 234 S.W.2d 818 (1950)

(no "driving"

where the car is completely still).
16. See generally Morgan, Procedure and Evidence-1955 Tennessee Survey,
8 VAND. L. REV. 1071 et seq. (1955). A number of cases involved presumptions of possession for the crime of possessing intoxicating liquor: Veal
v. State, 268 S.W.2d 345 (Tenn. 1954); Lampey v. State, 268 S.W.2d 572 (Tenn.
1954); Evans v. State, 270 S.W.2d 186 (Tenn. 1954); Reece v. State, 273
S.W.2d 475 (Tenn. 1954). An important case dealt with the competency of
a witness to testify to the results of a drunkometer test for intoxication:
Fortune v. State, 277 S.W.2d 381 (Tenn. 1955). A novel case held that for
the trial judge to shake his head without explanation during defendant's
closing arguments constituted reversible error as a silent comment on the
evidence. Veal v. State, 268 S.W.2d 345 (Tenn. 1954). Other criminal cases
were: Crawford v. State, 273 S.W.2d 689 (Tenn. 1954) (dying declarations);
Stooksbury v. State, 274 S.W.2d 10 (Tenn. 1954) (judicial notice that 1952
Chrysler worth more than $60 in July 1953); East v. State, 277 S.W.2d 361
(Tenn. 1955) (taking fingerprints held no violation of privilege against selfincrimination); Jones v. State, 277 S.W.2d 371 (Tenn. 1955) (error for prosecution to cross-examine defendant as to prior crimes for which he had been
indicted but for which he had been acquitted or which had been nolle prossed);
Shields v. State, 270 S.W.2d 367 (Tenn. 1954) (limitation of number of defendant's character witnesses); Walker v. State, 273 S.W.2d 707 (Tenn. 1954)
(cross-examination of defendant's character witnesses as to defendant's
prior acts of misconduct). Two cases dealt with the sufficiency of the description of the premises to be searched contained in a search warrant:
Williams v. State, 270 S.W.2d 184 (Tenn. 1954) (description taken from tax
list held sufficient); Worden v. State, 273 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1954) [search of
multiple premises held insufficient; see Note, 31 A.L.R.2d 864 (1953)1.
17. 269 S.W.2d 607 (Tenn. 1954).
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is no constitutional immunity from an unlawful arrest."'18

Preliminary Examination: The Tennessee criminal code provides
that upon arrest without a warrant by a private person the latter shall
take the arrestee before a magistrate or deliver him to an officer
"without unnecessary delay."'19 Perhaps by analogy, although not
expressly so provided in the code, a police officer who arrests has
a duty to produce the arrested person before a magistrate without
unnecessary delay. 20 In East v. State2 ' the court held that when the
arrest was at noon on November 4 there was no unnecessary delay
when the defendant's examination was on November 5, and that the
federal cases outlawing confessions obtained during a period of unlawful detention,22 and federal cases condemning state use of coerced
confessions,2 3 were inapplicable because (1) no confession was involved in the case and (2) no mistreatment of the defendant occurred.
Of course mere delay in the preliminary examination without some
prejudice to the defendant's defense, is not a reason to reverse a conviction.
Extradition: In State ex rel. Trigg v. Thompson2 4 Trigg, who had
been charged with an Indiana crime, and who had been arrested in
Tennessee pursuant to an extradition warrant issued by the Tennessee
governor, petitioned for release on habeas corpus on the grounds (1)
he was not present in Indiana when the crime allegedly was committed and (2) the affidavit sent the Tennessee governor by Indiana
did not show personal knowledge of the commission of the crime by
affiant. The court held that the writ was properly denied because (1)
the evidence disclosed that Trigg was in Indiana on the fatal day 25 and
(2) since the affidavit in question satisfied the governors of the two
states, the judiciary should not interfere.
Bail: Although a Tennessee criminal defendant before his trial has
a constitutional right to bail (except in capital cases where the evidence against him is strong),26 he loses his constitutional right to bail
18. Id. at 608.
19. TENN. CODE AwN. § 11544 (Williams 1934).
20. Id. § 11515 (provides that no one shall be committed to prison for a
criminal matter until a magistrate shall have held a (preliminary) examination). Most states expressly provide for a speedy preliminary examination
after an arrest by a police officer.
21. 277 S.W.2d 361 (Tenn. 1955).
22. E.g., McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
23. E.g., Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949).

24. 270 S.W.2d 332 (Tenn. 1954).
25. The UNORM CRIMAL ExTRADrIoT

ACT provides for the extradition
of one who cannot be said to have "fled from justice" because he was never

in the demanding state, e.g., D in Tennessee shoots across the state line killing
V in Kentucky; Kentucky could extradite under the terms of the statute.
The asylum state does not, on a habeas corpus petition, go into the question
of the guilt or innocence of the accused; it cannot look behind the official
papers accompanying the request for extradition. Thus it seems rather
strange that the Trigg case considered the evidence as to Trigg's presence in
Indiana on the date of the crime.
26. TENN. CONST. Art. I, § 15.
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after conviction of a felony,27 although the legislature may and has
provided for bail pending appeal under limited circumstances. 28 The
trial judge loses his jurisdiction to admit to bail after conviction once
the case has come to an end, and a chancery court never has jurisdiction to admit to bail after the termination of the case. 29
Wallace v. State3 dealt with the problem of forfeiture of bail. The
defendant, who had been continued on bail pending his motion for
a new trial after conviction for robbery, was rearrested upon a void
warrant when he got into trouble with the law in another matter.
When thus under arrest in charge of a police officer he escaped, went
to Virginia and was there caught in the act of another robbery. Are
the sureties on the bail bond exonerated by such events? The court
held no, because (1) although rearrest normally exonerates the sureties on the bail bond, rearrest on a void warrant does not, and (2)
the sureties do not escape forfeiture by the defendant's later arrest and
imprisonment in a foreign state.
Jury: The presence of a member of an exempted class (here a
minister) on a grand jury is not a ground to abate an indictment,3 '
although the rule may well be different as regards the presence of a
disqualified person (e.g., an insane person or one convicted of an
infamous crime) on such a jury.
In Toombs v. State,32 a prosecution for receiving stolen property, a
member of the trial jury was the husband of a first cousin of the owner
of the property stolen, and the two families were friends. On the
voir dire this juror was silent when asked whether he knew any reason
why he should not serve. The relationship was not discovered until
after a verdict of guilty. The court held that there should be a new
trial because of the presence on the jury of this juror who kept silent
when he should have disclosed his relationship to the victim of the
crime for which the defendant was being tried.
Indictment: Motion to Quash Versus Plea in Abatement. Like most
states, Tennessee criminal procedure provides, in addition to the plea
to the merits (guilty or not guilty), for a variety of other procedural
devices for raising possible defenses: the plea in bar, plea in abatement, motion to quash, demurrer. As in most states, these devices
may not be used once the defendant has pleaded to the merits. In
Walker v. State3 3 the unfortunate defendant picked the wrong device
27. Rosenbaum v. Campbell, 268 S.W.2d 580 (Tenn. 1954).
28. TENN. CoDE ANN. § 11658 (Williams 1934).
29. Rosenbaum v. Campbell, supra note 27. Here the case ended when defendant's conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court without considering
the merits because of defects in the bill of exceptions. He is now asking for
bail pending a suit in chancery court for a new trial
30. 269 S.W.2d 780 (Tenn. 1954).
31. East v. State, 277 S.W.2d 361 (Tenn. 1955).
32. 270 S.W.2d 649 (Tenn. 1954), discussed more fully in Morgan, supra
note 16.
33. 273 S.W.2d 707 (Tenn. 1954) (irregularity in grand jury proceedings
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at the wrong time- (1) he moved to quash when he should have
pleaded in abatement, and so was out of luck; also (2) he was so inept
as to plead not guilty first and then make his motion to quash, and
was thus doubly wrong. In view of the defendant's difficulty of selecting the proper procedural device from the several possibilities
(rather reminiscent of the outdated era when one selected the proper
form of action or lost, whatever the merits of the case), it would seem
that the federal practice of raising all objections by means of a motion
to dismiss 34 would be much preferable.

Indictment: Vagueness. A criminal defendant is of course entitled to
be informed of the charge against him, both because of the requirements of the state constitution 35 and federal due process of law.3 0
Thus a vague indictment is bad. In the municipal violation case of
Robinson v. Memphis37 the defendant was in effect charged with a
violation within the city limits of Chapter 49 of the Acts of 1939 and
the rules and regulations thereunder adopted by the state commissioner of finance and taxation. Chapter 49 consists of many sections
and subsections covering all sorts of prohibited transactions with
alcoholic liquor-manufacture, sale, receipt, possession, storage, transportation, distribution. For municipal violations the rules of civil procedure apply, and civil procedure requires adequate notice to the
defendant of the complaint against him. The court properly held that
the charge here was much too vague, and a motion in arrest of judgment should have been granted after conviction. Of course the notice
requirements for criminal cases must be at least as definite as for
civil cases. A criminal indictment framed as vaguely as the charge in
the Robinson case would be equally bad, and no conviction could be
sustained based upon such a charge.
On the other hand, in State v. McAdams38 the indictment for the misdemeanor of reckless driving charged that the defendant on a certain
date in a certain county unlawfully drove an automobile over the
public roads in that county "carelessly and heedlessly, in wilful and
wanton disregard to the rights or safety of others, and without due
caution and circumspection, at a speed and in a manner so as to
endanger or be likely to endanger the life, limb or property of any
person." The court held that this indictment, written substantially
though not exactly in the language of the code section defining recknot appearing on the face of the indictment: plea in abatement is proper,
motion to quash improper).
34. FED. R. Cnmm. P. 12 (a) (abolishing pleas to the jurisdiction, pleas in
abatement, pleas in bar, demurrers, and motions to quash, and authorizing
the court to permit the motion to dismiss after a plea to the merits).
35. TENN.CONST. Art I, § 9.
36. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
37. 277 S.W.2d 341 (Tenn. 1955), discussed more fuly in Morgan, supra note
16.
38. 277 S.W.2d 433 (Tenn. 1955).
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less driving, was not too vague to fulfill the requirements of informing

the defendant of the charge against him, especially since it was rather
precise in specifying the defendant's wrong as reckless speeding.
Indictment: Charging the Proper Crime. It is a fundamental principle of procedural due process that one who is charged with crime A
cannot be convicted of crime B even if at the trial the proof clearly
proves he committed crime B.3 9 In Clark v. State,40 where the defendant was charged with crime A (bigamous cohabitation) and the
proof showed crime A, the court upset a conviction of crime B
(bigamy) on the same general principle that one cannot be convicted
of a crime for which he was not charged, no matter what the evidence
of guilt of such crime. Doubtless under the third possibility (indictment charges crime A, proof shows crime B, conviction of crime A)
the result would be the same.
But while bigamy and cohabitation after a bigamous marriage are
two separate crimes, it is clear that a lesser included offense (or an
offense of a lesser degree) is not a separate offense from the greater
offense (or the offense of the higher degree). Thus one can clearly
be convicted of manslaughter or battery on a charge of murder, or
of murder in the second degree on a charge of murder in the first degree. 41 In Rushing v. State42 a conviction of assault and battery with
intent to commit rape upon an indictment for rape was upheld, the
former being a lesser included offense of the latter. So also in Stooksbury v. State43 the court authorized a conviction for assault with intent to commit a felony on a charge of assault with intent to commit
first degree murder.
Indictment: Joinder of Offenses. A frequently occurring problem
in criminal cases involves the difficulty of determining whether the
defendant has committed one crime or two. Suppose D's single blow
kills both A and B.44 The problem is important because of the rule
that it is duplicity to charge several offenses in one count, though
closely connected offenses or similar offenses (even if separate offenses) may be joined in different counts of a single indictment. The
39. Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948).

40. 270 S.W.2d 361 (Tenn. 1954). The court held that bigamy and bigamous
cohabitation after a bigamous marriage are two separate crimes although
created by two separate clauses in the one section of the code, TENN. CODE ANN.

§ 11180 (Williams 1934): "If any person, being married, shall marry another
person ... or continue to cohabit with such second husband or wife in this
state."
41. TENN. CODE ANN. § 11758-60 (Williams 1934). The rule would doubtless
be the same in the absence of statute.
42. 268 S.W.2d 563 (Tenn. 1954).
43. 274 S.W.2d 10 (Tenn. 1954).
44. One offense: Gunter v. State, 111 Ala. 23, 20 So. 632 (1896); Clem v.
State, 42 Ind. 420 (1873). Two offenses: People v. Majors, 65 Cal. 138, 3 Pac.
597 (1884). Tennessee would apparently hold one offense: Smith v. State,
159 Tenn. 674, 21 S.W.2d 400 (1929) (motorist recklessly hit two boys, killing

one; one offense).
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problem is equally important in the area of double jeopardy, where
one cannot be twice in jeopardy for the "same offense."
Where the indictment charges several different but connected (or
similar) offenses in different counts in one indictment, the defendant
may move (after the proof is in) to make the prosecution elect on
which offense it will go to the jury. The general rule is that this
motion will be granted only if the defendant is embarrassed in his defense by the multiplicity of charges against him.45 Where the different
offenses are charged in one count, the indictment may be bad for
duplicity; but aside from this the problem as to the defendant's embarrassment remains. In Cox v. State46 the defendant was charged
in one count with displaying his sexual organ "on January 5, 1954,
and other occasions before this indictment found." Different females
testified to different acts of display on different dates. The defendant's
motion to have the state elect one incident on which to go to the jury
was denied. The court held that this was reversible error, on the
ground that the defendant might be embarrassed by double jeopardy
trouble later. It would seem that if the indictment had contained
several counts, one for each separate incident (each specifying the
incident, the date and the female victim), the motion to elect would
have been properly denied. The difficulty here was in the failure
to charge the separate offenses separately.
It has been already noted that the court has stated that the crime of
conspiracy, and the completed crime which the defendants conspired
to commit, are separate crimes. 47 Without doubt they should be

charged in separate counts if included in the same indictment.
Double Jeopardy: Same Offense Versus Different Offenses. As just
noted, it is not always easy to say whether the defendant has committed one offense or several offenses when one action causes several
injuries. In Duke v. State48 A and B, strikers, beat up X and Y, nonstriking truck driver and helper. Actually A battered X while B
beat Y. In a prior trial A and B had been convicted of battery of X
(A for doing the actual beating, B for his aid and encouragement).
Now A and B are being tried for the beating of Y, and their defense
is double jeopardy. The court held that the beating of X is a separate
offense from the beating of Y, so that double jeopardy does not bar
the prosecution for the Y affair.
49
Trial: Defense of Shooting to Effect an Arrest. In Shields v. State
the defendant, a constable, was prosecuted for maliciously shooting
an automobile. His defense was that he shot to effect an arrest without
45. Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396 (1894)
court's discretion in the matter).
46. 270 S.W.2d 182 (1954).
47. State v. Smith, supra note 7.
48. 273 S.W.2d 142 (1954).

49. 270 S.W.2d 367 (1954).

(emphasizing the trial
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a warrant, having reason to believe that the automobile driver was
committing a felony. When questioned as to the basis of his belief,
he testified that an informer had told him that the driver had committed a crime, but he refused to divulge the informer's name, until
the judge said that he must answer; whereupon he gave a name and
was very vague on cross-examination as to the person of this name.
The court held that when the issue was his reasonable belief, it was
proper to make him spell out the basis of the belief by naming the
source of his information.
Trial: Instructions. The court reiterated that alleged errors in instructions to the jury must be pointed out at the trial in order to be
considered on appeal, and that failure to instruct is not error where
there is no request to instruct.50 The court made a curious statement
in Walker v. State.51 The defendant, charged with statutory rape,
testified that he had not accomplished the necessary penetration for
the crime. He requested an instruction that the indictment did not
cover assault with intent to commit statutory rape. Since assault
with intent to commit rape is probably a lesser included offense in
rape, this instruction stated the law incorrectly and so was properly
refused; but the reason the court gave was that it was properly refused because the jury had convicted him of rape. If this means,
as it seems to, that one charged with a serious crime (e.g., murder)
who gives evidence of a lesser included offense (e.g., manslaughter,
battery) cannot complain of refusal of the trial judge to instruct as
to the lesser crime after he has been convicted of the greater crime,
52
it seems obviously unsound.
Sentence: Since the indeterminate sentence law5 3 is not applicable

to convictions of first degree murder, what is the effect of an erroneous
indeterminate sentence for such a crime? The court held that the
judgment is not void so as to enable the convict to secure his release on habeas corpus. 54 Although Tennessee is a state which gives
the jury a large part to play in the determination of the sentence for
felonies, with misdemeanors the court sets the punishment unless the
defendant makes a seasonal demand that the jury fix his penalty.55
Habitual Criminal: In Chandler v. Fretag56 the United States
Supreme Court held to be a violation of Fourteenth Amendment due
50. Crawford v. State, 273 S.W.2d 689 (1954).
51. 273 S.W.2d 707 (1954). See supranote 3.
52. 26 Am. JuR., Homicide 544-45 (1940): "Clearly when requested to do
so, the court must charge upon the included degrees of the offense charged,
where there is evidence justifying a finding of guilt of the lower offense; its
refusal to do so will constitute reversible error if the defendant is convicted

of the higher degree."
53.
54.
55.
ANN.
56.

ANN. § 11766 (Williams 1934).
State ex rel. Gosnell v. Edwards, 277 S.W.2d 444 (Tenn. 1955).
James v. State, 268 S.W.2d 341 (Tenn. 1954), construing TENN.
§ 11765 (Williams 1934).
348 U.S. 3 (1954).
TENN. CODE

CODE

1002
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process the earlier Tennessee practice, in habitual criminal cases, of
advising the defendant orally, at his trial for his present crime, that
he will also be tried as an habitual criminal, at least if the defendant
is not also granted his requested continuance to secure the services of
counsel to fight the habitual criminal charge. This unfair practice
was, however, discontinued even before the Supreme Court's decision
57
in the Chandlercase.
The Tennessee code requires that for habitual criminal treatment
for a fourth conviction the three prior convictions must be "for separate offenses, committed at different times and on different occasions." 58 In Canupp v. State59 the defendant previously had been
convicted of three apparently similar crimes (the nature of which
does not appear), one each in June, July and August. Although the
case is silent on the point, perhaps the three were tried in one trial
under one indictment containing three counts. The court held without much discussion that these counted as three prior offenses. This
seems correct under a statute worded like Tennessee's. 0 The court
in the Canupp case, following decisions from other jurisdictions,
further held that the habitual criminal penalty of life imprisonment
without possibility of parole does not constitute cruel and unusual
6
punishment. '
Appeal: As already noted, the appellate court will not consider
alleged errors in giving or refusing instructions not brought to the
62
attention of the trial court at the time of giving the instructions.
Several convictions were appealed on the ground that the verdict was
against the weight of the evidence. The court points out, as it
has done in the past, that with evidence pro and con the jury's findings
on disputed questions of fact are binding on the appellate court, unless
the court concludes that the evidence preponderates against such findings. 63
The Tennessee Supreme Court on appeal has no power, as exists
in a few states, 64 to reduce a sentence which falls within legal limits
simply because it considers the sentence excessive. However, in
Stooksbury v. State,65 the court, finding that the evidence preponderated against a verdict of assault with intent to commit first
57. TENN. CODE ANN.§ 11863.5 (Williams Supp. 1952) provides for inclusion,
in the indictment for the substantive offense, of the habitual criminal charge.
58. Id., § 11863.1.
59. 270 S.W.2d 356 (1954).
60. See Notes, 58 A.L.R. 20 (1929), 82 A.L.R. 345 (1933), 116 A.L.R. 209
(1938), 132 A.L.R. 91 (1941), 139 A.L.R. 673 (1942).
61. Ibid.
62. See note 50 supra.
63. Walker v. State, 273 S.W.2d 707 (Tenn. 1954) (conviction upheld);
Stooksbury v.State, 274 S.W.2d 10 (Tenn. 1954) (conviction reversed).
64. See L. Hall, Reduction of Criminal Sentences on Appeal, 37 COL. L. REV.
521 (1937).
65. 274 S.W.2d 10 (Tenn. 1954).
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degree murder, though it did support a conviction for the lesser included crime of assault with intent to commit a felony, reduced the
maximum punishment from twenty-one (the maximum for assault
to murder) to five years imprisonment (the maximum for assault to
commit a felony), without remanding for a new trial.66 This precedure
seems eminently sensible.
66. An earlier case on the same point is Corlew v. State, 181 Tenn. 220,
180 S.W.2d 900 (1944). There the court, finding that the evidence did not
support a grand larceny conviction but did support one for petit larceny, reduced the sentence to one year, the minimum for petit larceny, but further
provided that if the state did not wish to accept it, a new trial would be
ordered. The question of the court's power to give a modified sentence was
there thrashed out.

